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China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a
Rising Power
REVIEWED BY THOMAS MAXWELL*

KRISTOFF, NICHOLAS D. AND WUDUNN, SHERYL, CHINA
WAKES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER,
Times Books, a division of Random House (1994); ($25.00); ISBN 08129-2252-2; 488 pp. (pbk.).
The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe began
about five years ago, a period of time in geo-political terms rather
comparable to the period after a major volcanic eruption, during which
we expect to see the dust settle and "things" begin to stabilize. Sunsets
clarify, weather patterns return to typical expectations, and we see
what ballast there is to stand up to the winds of the ordinary, which
we geo-politically interpret to be self-interest-driven open markets and
free elections. So far so good, western diplomacy analysts conclude; no
madman with a following has come forward with a mandate to re-command the nuclear threat that used to dictate our policy, and no existing balances among western nations have been thrown out of kilter by
the new free-lance nations that are jockeying to join the western mix.
Part of the non-event for the west arises from the perception that
courting formerly communist interests commercially has proved to be
unattractive: a lot of confused and dispirited people with very little
money burdened with an inherited commercial infrastructure that
redefines hopeless disaster in every way there is. They must heal, the
way someone who's broken every bone in his body in a car wreck must
heal, before prospects for improvement can be discussed.
Western investment is not rushing in to fill the vacuum. Rather,
it is being coaxed to come forward on humanitarian grounds or to
create a presence that might later prove useful. There is also the strategic initiative that cautions that desperation among our former enemies, due to their uncertainty whether they can even meet the basic
requirements of simple existence, could torque into something ugly. So
we watch and wait with a good deal of pity for these people coloring
our optimism for their emergence-to-be, and also with amazement that
the communist regimes could have maintained the illusion of vitality
for as long as they did.
The massacre at Tiananmen Square occurred at roughly the same
time as the fall of the Berlin Wall. The course of China since that time
tends to be analyzed in the west under the same eurocentric lamp: the
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upheavals in central and eastern Europe succeeded, while the one in
China did not. The Europeans can look forward to a light of freedom
and prosperity at the end of their torturous tunnel, the Chinese to
more bleak communist repression. On top of that, China's victory in its
struggle against the United States over MFN status seems to have
sent a clear message that the Chinese communists will do what they
want, and we can't stop them. North Korea, Viet Nam, and Burma,
Asia's other communist locks, seem to feel no anti-communist reform
pressure either, as a consequence of China's stone-wall. So, we watch
China and wait, pity coloring our pessimism.
Of course those who look closer know that this interpretation by
no means tells the whole story about China during the last five years;
it is perhaps not even the most important part of the story. The salient
fact of the situation is that China has accomplished far more extensive,
and far more successful, "free" market reform without an overthrow of
communism, than all but a few areas of formerly communist Europe
have. Making this even more remarkable is the equally well-established fact that China's human rights and personal freedom record is
improving very rapidly, adamant communist rhetoric and all. In this
area, it certainly has not reached the level of European reform, especially when evaluated in traditional western terms, but it is also true
that there is no struggle ongoing in China equal in intensity or savagery to the civil war in Bosnia.
China Wakes is an eye-opening, up-to-the-minute account of China
as seen over the last five years by husband and wife Nicholas Kristoff
and Sheryl WuDunn, until recently American correspondents for the
New York Times. Working out of Beijing, the two became the first
husband and wife team to win a Pulitzer Prize for journalism in 1989
for their coverage of Tiananmen Square. As this book shows, however,
they also spent a tremendous amount of time in the countryside, away
from the capital, often with what they describe as an unusual degree
of freedom from "handling." They believe, moreover, that the knowledge gained from these visits is more telling in describing modern
China than what goes on in the city. Ms. WuDunn is ChineseAmerican (speaking somewhat weak Chinese), and her ability to blend
in often gained her extraordinary access, and more than once saved
her backside when she was caught going too far. Beyond that, the
search for the meaning and message of her ancestral roots allows her
further access to peasants and villagers. These interactions give them
the sense that they have cracked another bit of the code of communication, a self-assurance that on the odd occasion they truly see down to
the level of the actual, where the official charades meet the flow of
reality.
The collaboration is achieved by interweaving alternate chapters
by each author rather than by an undifferentiated pastiche. Primarily,
the two authors differ, to the small extent that they do, in personality,
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rather than in writing style, focus, or intelligence. They make no excuse or apology for their blatant western outrage at the horrendous
disregard for human rights and decency that is common in Chinese
life, nor for their rather firm belief that nothing short of full democracy
deserves to be called political freedom. But despite these
conventionalities, Kristoff and WuDunn effortlessly convey a sense of
otherness about China that many more mystically dazzled observers
never have. And they succeed also at breathing new life into the not
very original conclusion that China is Confucian, clannish, and dynastic, that it always has been and always will be, and that the communist dynasty is just another blip on the Chinese time-line. Arriving at
this conclusion independently of prior indoctrination is the thing that
makes their work fresh. Sometimes the wheel of scholarship reinvented is just the wheel you want to have.
Nevertheless, the lack of secondary scholarship in general is this
book's weakest aspect. Depending on the reader's need to make connections between this new understanding of and appreciation for China
and relations with China of a more technical nature - finance, commerce, politics, the law, and so forth - China Wakes will seem either
more or less comprehensive. We are told China's economy is growing,
for instance, but this news is not interconnected with the kinds of hard
statistics that articulate market dynamics. The authors state that
inflation-control in China is good for a developing country, but it's
hardly analyzed at all in specific terms, and likewise for currency exchange rates. That China has signed certain intellectual property conventions is reported to us, but not which ones or how the government
plans to enforce them. How Chinese corruption works internally is
wonderfully, distressingly detailed in chapter after chapter, but very
little is told about the sort of corruption foreign commercial and legal
interests will encounter if they explore opportunities in China. Related
to this is the problematical issue of refugees and their legal defense,
made especially complicated by the current inclination of sinophone
countries not to antagonize each other by sheltering refugees, no matter how valid their reasons for fleeing. China Wakes presents a few
cases of this problem quite vividly, but the technical details of how the
cases are structured legally are not described. It's possible the authors
do not follow technical fields very closely - although Kristoff was
trained in law at Oxford - and don't wish to embark on analyses they
can't see through to their ends, or possibly their purpose is so clearly
tied to their autobiographical moments that they assume they're addressing an audience similarly disposed to casual and personally felt
perceptions. Even granting the validity of this approach, however, the
least the other sort of reader could expect is the rudiments of a tie-in
pointing the way to certain technical reference points, and these are
few in China Wakes.
Be that as it may, this book portrays an emerging China. It is
clarifying and demystifying, and it acts as a potentially valuable guide
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for understanding the present and probable future of legal relationships between China and the west and with other Asian countries.
Foremost in the picture is the observation that in China, gradualism is
working, whereas in Europe a total break from central control has
seemed a grim, unavoidable necessity. Indeed, the European experience has seemed to bear this out, and attempts at finding a middle
way appearing gallingly pathetic.
European people in formerly communist controlled countries,
however, strike one as very much abandoned and stranded by comparison with the Chinese. Kristoff and WuDunn speak of a deep, ages-old
collective consciousness among the hundreds and hundreds of millions
of Chinese that the communists have demonstrated they are unfit to
oversee, a conclusion that most people have drawn but in whose fabric
they must remain entwined until a new dynastic network has formed
to take its place. The authors find a new use for the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian state structures, used previously
in State Department explanations for US policy in Central America
during the early eighties, presenting it as the single most cogent description of social and political change in China. If the totalitarianauthoritarian generality is a valid model to describe China, it could be
of great value to persons pursuing practical international relations
with that vast land: the new authoritarianChina allows considerable
freedom of action and private ownership for its citizens, so long as the
enterprising souls who try it do not openly criticize the government;
the old totalitarianChina disallowed both. The suggestion is that an
outside partner or consultant should recognize that this process of
variant imagery is part of the transition game and not get too alarmed.
When Chinese communism wore Chairman Mao's face, gradualism
was decried as the most fearful of western tactics: the slow infiltration
of values and seduction of the masses. Ironically, western influence is
doing just this, a conclusion that both authors arrive at time and time
again, and there is so official party rhetoric condemning it. Their continual reference to Deng Xiaoping as the emperor, at first in quotation
marks but later without, suggests that it is respect for the traditional
role of royal leadership, rather than that of explainer and educator,
that Chinese communism is falling into demanding. As for Confucianism, which communism pledged to eradicate along with capitalism, the
last forty-five years have touched it and transformed it so that it still
serves at some subliminal level as the social bonding agent of the culture, but many of its most severe precepts have been truncated. The
traditions that have kept China's peasants poor, sick, starving, and
uneducated, have especially been challenged resolutely and with considerable success. Literacy, infant mortality, childhood education, and
life-expectancy are now expressed in numbers quite comparable to
those of America. For instance, a prohibition against satellite dishes is
quite openly flouted throughout the country - and, for a price, ignored
by the authorities - and the whole TV wasteland is beamed down just
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like it is everywhere else, bringing exposure to the same consumer-conformist culture.
As one reads China Wakes, the steady reciprocation between discouragement and encouragement, ultimately leaning toward encouragement, creates an emotional flow for the book that is a bit too pat,
too predictable. The fact that this flow is so heartfelt and so strongly
based on fact - the authors are fine reporters - basically saves it
from the usual fate of the too-predictable: death by tedium. It's when
the reader finally realizes that it doesn't matter in the least whether
the authors feel encouraged or discouraged about China, that one gives
into it, or at least accepts it. It's an achievement to have acquired the
perspective through sheer emotional will of viewing a nation of 1.2 billion people as family, about whose members one feels a right and an
obligation to worry. In the final analysis, Kristofls and WuDunn's
intuitive, anecdotal, occasionally picaresque narrative proves wellsuited for their task.
Troubling, however, is the thin treatment given the questions of
the expense of the Chinese economic miracle and who will pay. The
book describes a few of the most alarming environmental trouble-areas, such as having an ozone depleting refrigerator in every hut or
burning coal from one corner of the country to the other, yet discussion
of these issues is fleeting. Desertification is not even mentioned. Another potential cost is human, measured in social and cultural displacement. It's quite possible for an ancient culture to meet its demise
in the human prosperity it helps makes possible; four thousand years
old or not, there's nothing in China's longevity that guarantees its
future, nor is there any assurance that continued communist presence,
with its constant power to strike out and suppress whenever it chooses, would be able to stop a slide of Chinese society into formations
more characteristic of the west. Whether western journalists should
feel they have the perspicacity to comment on what is and what is not
"Chinese" is beside the point. More directly, we must ask if it isn't
possible that China could change so much that, so far as the miracle
goes, all bets would be off, and Kristoff and WuDunn do not venture
very far toward supplying an answer.
This question must be addressed by any outside interest seeking
to form a relationship with China. If we can assume that over the next
few decades China - and the rest of Asia, for that matter - will exist
in a state of active flux as a miasma of chaotic contradictions, then one
must hedge opportunities against one another, putting together a
broad enough exposure-base to assure picking up on the general trend.
But broad exposure is, well, broad exposure, and aside from picking up
on the general trend, we need assurances as well that the general
trend itself has some legs.
Does China Wakes provide these assurances? Does it supply us
with the keys to negotiating the local chaos of China's nearly eleven
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per cent annual GNP growth rate, and indeed to knowing whether the
trend will continue? By itself, no. The professional and technical press
must be researched as well. But as a clear-eyed look at what is truly
important in the lives of the Chinese people, China Wakes is in a class
by itself. In fact, the book creates another sensation in the reader quite
apart from the nominal subject at hand. Because of the book's unique
perspectives, and because of the type of tight, journalistic analysis
each anecdote and each issue is given, there arises a distinct shock of
recognition that there we are, too: the self-censorship, the resourcefulness of government to preserve itself, the fascism of imposed "traditional" values, the wide disparity of wealth, the brazen truth about
what privileges and concessions money can buy. All are characteristic
of both cultures in differing degrees. Though we often say it, we usually don't mean it when we say our country is universally corrupt; what
we mean is that a few people are corrupt but they're to be found just
about anywhere. Our institutions, in theory at least, are essentially
clean. China wakes, however, gives pause to that thought. Perhaps
arousing this sensation is the farthest thing from the authors' minds,
but their portrait of authoritarianism in China has broad application
around the globe.
The disturbing trend emerging in some minds that competitiveness and public order are best achieved where personal freedom is
guided by the cool hand of central control has begun to reach the level
of public policy in some places, the United States being an example.
While Kristoff and WuDunn make it quite clear they do not share this
interpretation of how things ought to be, they express little confidence
that the trend will be easy to reverse.
That might be the book's most important message, that as China
emerges we must avoid partially submerging ourselves in order to
meet them half-way. We must accept our occasional inefficiencies and
sentimentalities as part of the tableau of freedom and hope that China
will emerge all the way too, finally to be caught up in the same glorious, cluttered exuberance.

